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FACT STYLE ADJUDICATION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: THE LIMITS OF LAWYERING
ROGER

B. DWORKINi

The fourth amendment cases are a mess! When the Supreme Court
can seldom muster a majority on any important fourth amendment issue;
when Justice White in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice charges that
the Court has ceased even "to strive for clarity and consistency of analysis;"' and when in the same case Justice Stewart, for once speaking
for five members of the Court, responds that "[t]he time is long past
when men believed that development of the law must always proceed by
the smooth incorporation of new situations into a single coherent analytical framework,"'2 and rejects in one sentence "clarity," "certainty" and
"facile consistency," '3 the time has arrived to ask what has gone wrong.
The obvious scapegoat is the exclusionary rule which, by forcing the
states into a federal model of search and seizure administration,' compels
state courts to grapple with complex problems of federal constitutional
law while supposedly forcing the Supreme Court to water down federal
constitutional protections to make state compliance feasible.' This process of simultaneous supervision and watering down might well be thought
to explain the development of a complex and increasingly incomprehensible body of law and the staggering state and federal search and seizure
case loads. Since the exclusionary rule is criticized on its merits, abolition
to provide a fresh start has an initial appeal. If the criticisms on the
merits fail, though, other less obvious causes of the chaos must be sought
before making the easy assumption that rejecting the exclusionary rule
will solve the problems of fourth amendment jurisprudence. In my view,
the criticisms on the merits do fail. More importantly, they are misfocused
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510, 521 (1971)
2. 403 U.S. at 483.

(dissenting opinion).

3. Id.
4. See Aguilar v. Texas, 373 U.S. 108 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23

(1963).
5. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 116 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45-46 (1963) (Harlan, 3., concurring in the result).
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and obscure perception of the reasons for the failure of the exclusionary
rule, if it is a failure, and for the confused state of fourth amendment law.
The exclusionary rule is attacked on several grounds :6 (1) It aids
the guilty, allowing criminals to go free "because the constable has blundered;"' (2) it fails to aid innocent victims of governmental misconduct;
(3) it fails to achieve its purpose, which is to deter the police from unreasonable searches and seizures; (4) to the extent it is not based on a policy
of deterrence, it represents a "sporting contest" theory of litigation which
is inappropriate in matters as important as balancing the individual's
right to be secure from governmental intrusion against society's right to
be secure from crime; (5) it is a drastic and inflexible sanction which
leaves no room for case by case response to trivial or unintentional invasions of fourth amendment rights; (6) although designed to punish
police officers, instead it punishes society generally; and (7) it also
punishes prosecutors who lose their cases because of the rule's application.
These criticisms can be answered. Mapp v. Ohio' extended the
federal exclusionary rule to the states for two purposes: To deter unlawful police conduct 9 and to preserve and foster the principle of judicial
integrity, the notion that the law and courts must not sanction official
lawlessness and use that lawlessness as part of the process of "correcting"
lawbreakers.'" Thus, the criminal goes free, but as Mr. Justice Clark aptly
stated, "it is the law that sets him free."" Those who see the exclusionary
rule as representing the wrong choice in the battle between criminals and
the police misconceive the basic issue. The choice is not between criminals
on the one hand and police on the other, but rather between two different
kinds of lawbreakers. Why the lawbreaking police should prevail in a
choice between evils is not at all clear. Indeed, in terms of societal danger
a police officer who violates constitutional rights poses a greater threat
than almost any "criminal" imaginable.
By focusing on societal danger, one exposes the second major misconception of critics of the exclusionary rule. The critics forget that
neither the rule nor the fourth amendment exists to protect the criminal
in whose case the rule is applied. Both exist to protect society-all those
citizens who never break laws more serious than those prohibiting over6. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 665 (1970).
7. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E.585, 587 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied,

270 U.S. 657 (1926).
8. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. Id. at 651-53, 656.
10. Id. at 659-60.
11. Id. at 659.
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time parking. One critical fact to remember about fourth amendment
cases is that criminals are the only tools available to protect everyone else's
fourth amendment rights. The inadequacy of remedies other than the exclusionary rule is widely recognized,12 and the rule itself requires criminals for its application. Narrowly viewed, the exclusionary rule is very
unattractive, because in the vast majority of cases in which it is applied
the immediate result is to free an obviously guilty person. But the guilty
defendant is freed to protect the rest of us from unlawful police invasions
of our security and to maintain the integrity of our institutions. Thus
to suggest that the exclusionary rule falls to aid the innocent or that society
rather than the policeman suffers for the policeman's transgression is nonsense. The innocent and society are the principal beneficiaries of the
exclusionary rule.
Is the rule unjust, though, because it punishes the prosecutor by
making him lose his case because of someone else's transgression? Obviously not! Losing a client's lawsuit can hardly be called "punishment"
in any meaningful sense. Indeed one would prefer to think that prosecutors view themselves as servants of the law, who are pleased to see our institutions vindicated, than to assume they are vainglorious principals seeking to turn every case into an ego trip. However, even if losing a case can
be viewed as punishment, the prosecutor has the power to avoid the
punishment and put it back onto the police who deserve it by exercising
his discretion not to prosecute, discretion which the hypothetical glory
seeker could exercise to achieve almost a 100 per cent conviction record.
Moreover, at least some prosecutors could (and all could try to) influence
police behavior in the direction of obedience to the fourth amendment. To
the extent they fail to do so, they deserve the punishment they receive.
Finally, losing cases because of applications of the exclusionary rule may
be a political benefit to a prosecutor looking either for an excuse or a
campaign issue. The exclusionary rule does not provide a basis for legitimate sympathy for prosecutors.
Conceding all my arguments thus far, one might still point to the
inflexibility of the exclusionary rule as an evil since it applies the same
penalty to unintentional and trivial violations of the Constitution as to
intentional and serious ones. However, no violation of the fourth amendment can properly be considered trivial. The decision that police conduct
violated the fourth amendment, whatever the remedy, is a determination
12. This inadequacy was recognized in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, citing People v.

Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955), where the California court found
that other remedies had "completely failed" to protect fourth amendment rights. Even
Chief Justice Burger has recognized that the inadequacy noted in Mapp and Cahan still
exists and has proposed a new solution to the problem. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 415 (1971) (dissenting
opinion).
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that the police have made more than a trivial illegitimate invasion of interests important enough to be constitutionally protected.
Unintentional invasions, of course, are possible, especially when
fourth amendment law is unintelligible to everyone, presumably including
the police. "Punishing" someone for an unintentional transgression is
harsh. But deterrence is a harsh rationale for imposing sanctions. If the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then it must be harsh
enough to make policemen notice and fear it and inflexible and certain
enough in its application to preclude the possibility of avoiding the sanction and hence the temptation to try. Just as a criminal law truly based on
deterrence would execute every person who did a prohibited act the day
after its commission without the possibility of escape through showings of
the absence of mens rea, defenses like insanity, or procedural devices like
the exclusionary rule, so also a rule which really seeks to deter the police
must be swiftly, surely, and uniformly applied. To argue that the exclusionary rule exists to deter the police, and that it is bad because it is harsh
and inflexible is to argue that it is bad because it is well suited to achieve
its purpose. To then add that it does not work anyway is to compound
the contradiction by refuting the inflexibility argument. As long as no
one is willing to argue that deterring police lawlessness is bad policy,
critics of the exclusionary rule cannot fairly attack it as being both too
effective and not effective enough.
What then of the argument that the exclusionary rule is inefficacious
as a deterrent? In approaching this argument one must be careful to make
sure that the rules of argument are fair. First, Chief Justice Burger is
wrong when he suggests 3 that deterrence is the sole basis for the exclusionary rule. The judicial integrity basis may be important enough to
support the rule in the absence of any deterrent efficacy at all. Thus a
demonstration that the rule does not deter does not without more make a
convincing case for rejecting it.
Second, Chief Justice Burger states that we lack sufficient evidence
to determine the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule," which, of
course, is true. The very existence of the rule prevents making a controlled study to provide the evidence. The Chief Justice then places the
burden of demonstrating the deterrent efficacy of the rule on its proponents. 5 Obviously, the assignment of the burden of proof on an issue
where evidence does not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome deter13. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 411, 413, 415 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
14. Id. at 416.
15. Id.
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minative." The Chief Justice's assignment of the burden is merely a
way of announcing a predetermined conclusion. So, of course, would be
the opposite choice-imposition of the burden on opponents of exclusion.
Fortunately, the burden need not be allocated at all. Allocation of burdens
of proof is merely a blind for disguising substantive policy decisions "
and is no aid to decision making.1 8 The deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule can be evaluated without resort to the notion of burdens of
proof. If all laws which are justified wholly or partly on the ground that
they deter undesirable conduct had to be justified by showing that they
actually do deter, very little of the criminal law, at least, could meet the
test. Deterrence is partly a matter of logic and psychology, largely a
matter of faith. The question is never whether laws do deter, but rather
whether conduct ought to be deterred; whether in a state of ignorance the
possibility of deterrence is worth the costs of a hopefully deterrent sanction, and how best to maximize the likelihood of deterrence. We simply
cannot afford the luxury of temporarily abandoning deterrence for the
intellectual satisfaction of conducting a controlled experiment.
In the search and seizure-exclusionary rule context, then, the retention or abolition of the exclusionary rule should turn on an evaluation of
its costs and potential benefits assuming that the law permits the rule to
work as well as possible. The point I wish to pursue is that the law does
not permit the rule to work as well as possible. I shall attempt to demonstrate why that is so and to suggest a new style of fourth amendment decision making to alleviate the problem. Once fourth amendment law permits
the exclusionary rule to work as well as can be expected of a deterrent
sanction, evaluation of the rule itself will be appropriate. Meanwhile, if
the Court abolishes the exclusionary rule, I believe the style of analysis I
recommend will remain useful as long as any sanctions are used to attempt
to enforce the fourth amendment. The central point is that any sanction,
any remedy, is only as good as the substantive law it enforces. The problem with the search and seizure cases lies with the substance, not the
remedy.
In order to deter conduct the prohibition against it must be clear,
unambiguous, not susceptible to quibbles or easy avoidance, and easily
understandable by the persons sought to be deterred. 9 Fourth amend16. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An. Essay on Juristic Imnaturity, 12
L. Rav. 5, 12 (1959) ; Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25

STAN.
VAND.

L. REv. 1151, 1172 (1972).
17. See generally Dworkin, supra note 16, at 1167-78.
18. Id. at 1164-67.
19. On the theoretical underpinnings of deterrence, see generally Andenaes, The
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966) ; Andenaes,
General Prevention-llusion or Reality, 43 J. CRlm. L.C. & P.S. 176 (1952). On the
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ment law is so uncertain, incomprehensible, quibble ridden, and ever
changing that it deprives any sanction of a meaningful chance to control
conduct.
What has brought us to this sorry pass? The answer, I believe, lies
in the style of adjudication the Supreme Court has adopted in fourth
amendment cases, in the way it approaches search, seizure, and arrest
questions. The Court has attempted to resolve the most difficult constitutional questions by resort to a style of decision making which may work
for resolving mundane and unavoidable problems like who is to be responsible for injuries suffered in an automobile accident, but which fails completely when the question is the graver one of what techniques the state
may pursue in its efforts to police the citizenry. The Court has attempted
to resolve these problems by what I call fact style decision making. That
is, it has regularly posed fourth amendment issues the way courts usually
pose questions for juries. So framed, the issues require the Court to
decide facts and attempt to fit them into legal molds broad enough to permit free form decision making, but narrow enough to prevent the most
extreme outrages. An examination 'of the cases shows that this approach,
whili assumes that fourth amendment law can develop meaningfully on
a case by case basis, and which finds great significance in differing factual
situations, is an abysmal failure.
Because the substantive law of the fourth amendment is the special
province of the courts, that is where legal reform must begin." Once the
courts, especially the Supreme Court, develop a useable body of fourth
amendment law, it will be- time enough to worry about remedies, administration, and the actual training of the police to comply with the law.
Obviously, the most basic question in search and seizure law is
whether any search or seizure has occurred at all. If there has been no
sealch or seizure, the fourth amendment does not apply and the Court
need never reach the question of whether the (nonexistent) search was
reasonable. In Katz v. United States,2 decided in 1967, the Court redemands of deterrence in the search and seizure context, see LaFave, Warrantless
Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the Quagmire, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL. 9, 30 (1972) ; LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. ,Ev. 391, 395-96

(1965).

20. Obviously reform through the courts poses problems of institutional competence.
See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part II:
Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. Rav. 566, 590-91 (1965). See
generally Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. Cr. REV. 75.
Efforts to achieve reform legislatively are being made, MODEL CODE OF PRE-AILRAIGINMENT
PaocEiuRE

§§ 210.1-290.4 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972), but the results are sometimes

bizarre, INDIANA CODE OF CM'AI. PROCEDURE §§ 35-2.1-1-1 to 35-2.1-4-5 (Sept. 1972
Proposed Final Draft).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a valuable discussion, see Kitch, Katz v. United
States: The Limits of the FourthAmendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133.
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jected old notions and held that a search subject to the dictates of the
fourth amendment occurs whenever the government invades the privacy
upon which a citizen justifiably relied. While a few problems, such as
the status of privacy invasions by off duty policemen,22 inhere in the requirement of government involvement, the heart of the controversy opened
by Katz is the question of what constitutes a justifiable expectation of
privacy.
Although Katz specifically held that a search may occur without a
"trespass"" or an invasion of a "constitutionally protected area,"2 thus
expanding the previously recognized range of the fourth amendment, it
is important to note that the justifiable expectations test is still a severe
restriction on the scope of fourth amendment protection. Certainly a layman would be surprised to learn that what constitutes a search turns not
upon the conduct of the searcher, but rather on the justifiability of the expectations of the person subjected to the search. The conduct of the
searcher would in normal parlance define a search. By limiting the relevance of that conduct to the question of whether a search was reasonable
assuming that a search had been made, the Court effectively isolated from
scrutiny a broad range of police conduct. 5
The lay understanding, of course, makes a good deal more sense than
the Katz test. Katz left open the possibility of highly intrusive conduct
being totally outside the fourth amendment, thereby opening an area of
hope to a policeman bent on questionable practices. No matter how offensive his conduct might be, in the absence of a finding that the subject
had a justifable expectation of privacy, the conduct would be immunized
from the exclusionary rule or any other fourth amendment sanction."
Moreover, a policeman preparing to look for evidence is asked under Katz
to determine whether another person expects privacy and whether that
expectation is justifiable. Even assuming the officer wishes to observe
constitutional guidelines, he is hardly in a position to make such determinations. Thus, the Katz test is wholly inappropriate as a test directed
at the police.
Most troublesome, of course, is the word "justifiable." The Court
nowhere explained what it meant by a justifiabl expectation of privacy,
but it did point to factors that made Mr. Katz's expectation justifiable:
22. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 451 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970) ; People v. Wolder, 4 Cal. App. 3d 984, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 788 (1970).
23. 389 U.S. at 353.
24. Id. at 350-52.
25. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
26. Cf. Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) (per curiam).
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One who occupies . .
[a telephone booth] shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.27
By focusing on Katz's actions designed to assure privacy (occupying a
booth, shutting a door, paying to make a call) the Court seemed to equate
justifiability with reasonableness. Indeed, characterizing the quoted
language as "[t] he critical fact in this case," 28 'Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, understood the Katz test to be one of "reasonable" expectations
of privacy."
Justifiability in the sense of reasonableness is a fact style inquiry.
One can easily imagine a jury being asked to decide whether the reasonable man expects privacy when he occupies a phone booth, closes the door,
and pays for his call. And if the question were submitted to a jury, the
answer would likely turn on how sophisticated and suspicious the jurors
were, how pervasive bugging was or was thought to be at the
time, and what attributes of the person overheard the jury was allowed to attribute to the reasonable man. If the reactions of second and
third year law students are any guide, the temptation to consider the subject's criminal activities in determining reasonableness would be almost
irresistable. Of course, since the fourth amendment exists to protect noncriminals, and since criminals are indispensable to the protection of noncriminals' fourth amendment rights," any consideration of criminality on
the question of reasonableness or justifiability seriously weakens the
fourth amendment. Nonetheless, that sort of weakening is invited when
the Court focuses on the wrong thing and then asks a fact style question
about it. Fact style questions are not dangerous when their answers are
unlikely to become rigidified into rules of law and when nonconstitutional
values are at stake. Quite the contrary is the case, though, when the
Supreme Court is engaged in constitutional adjudication.
In 1971, in United States v. White,8 a plurality of the Court took
fact style decision making to its almost irresistible extreme by considering
criminality on the question of justifiability. At the same time, though,
the plurality backed away from fact style adjudication by redefining justifiability. Defendant White was convicted for narcotics violations, partly
on the basis of testimony from government agents of incriminating conversations between defendant and one Jackson, an informant who carried
27.
28.
29.
30.

389 U.S. at 352.
Id. at 361 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 360-62.
See text accompanying note 12 supra.

31. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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a concealed radio transmitter which permitted the agents to overhear the
conversations. The conversations occurred in White's home, Jackson's
home, Jackson's car, and a restaurant. Jackson did not testify at trial.
Reversing the Seventh Circuit,3" the Supreme Court upheld the
government's actions and reinstated defendant's conviction. Justice
White, writing for a four man plurality of the Court, which included
Justice Stewart, the author of the Court's opinion in Katz, thought that,
"Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to the police.""3 One reading of
this language, perhaps the one which appealed to justice Stewart, would
be that any reasonable criminal would be aware of the risks of betrayal
and therefore would have no reasonable expectation of privacy for his conversations. Such a reading makes White the extreme example of fact style
adjudication; begs the central question by using a later determination of
criminality to justify the government's earlier activity which made the
determination possible; and puts the Supreme Court in the uncomfortable
position of hypothesizing about the expectations of reasonable criminals.
There is a more plausible reading of White. Never using the concept
of reasonableness, the plurality states that the
problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what
expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifiable"-what
expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence
of a warrant.34
Read in the context of that language and of the plurality's portentous assertion that "[n] or should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers
to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable,"3 5
the statement that a criminal "must" risk betrayal becomes not an assumption about what criminals surely do expect, but an imposition of a required expectation on them. Any actual expectations of privacy a criminal
might have had are no longer to be "constitutionally 'justifiable,'" because
he is a criminal. In other words, the question of justifiability is no longer
a question of reasonableness; it is now a question of moral justification.
Bad people are not morally justified in expecting privacy.
While the moral justifiability reading begs the same question as the
reasonableness reading, and while either reading leads to the same conclusion in the White context, in other contexts the moral justifiability
view is much more destructive than even the extreme version of the
32. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969) (en banc).

33. 401 U.S. at 752.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 753.
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reasonableness view. At least in some contexts a court might hypothesize
that even a criminal might reasonably expect privacy. However, no criminal would be morally justified in that expectation; thus, any intrusive
conduct is permissible as to criminals, at least in fourth amendment
terms, " since their conduct takes the government's conduct out of the
fourth amendment. Such a reading highlights the erroneous focus of Katz
and destroys the fourth amendment.
Fortunately, White never commanded majority support on the search
and seizure issue."7 Moreover, since White it has become clear that at
least one member of the-plurality did not mean what the opinion appeared
to say. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,8 decided only two and one half
months after White, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion backed away
from both Katz and White.
Coolidge involved the murder of a fourteen-year-old girl. After
questioning, defendant agreed to take a lie detector test. While he was out
of the house being tested, two policemen obtained his guns and some of
his clothing from his wife, after telling her that her husband was in "serious trouble." Later, believing they had enough evidence to justify arresting defendant and searching his house and cars, the police obtained arrest
and search warrants from the state's Attorney General acting as a justice
of the peace and proceeded to arrest defendant and impound his cars, which
were plainly visible from the street and defendant's house. At trial, the
state introduced one of the guns and the clothing as well as vacuum sweepings from defendant's car, which were offered to prove that the victim
had been in the car. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, 9 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider defendant's arguments that
his motions to supress the gun and particles should have been granted."'
The Supreme Court reversed.
After deciding that the warrant could not justify the search since the
36. Of course the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments provide some protection against especially aggravated invasions. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
37. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined Justice White's
opinion. Justice Black concurred in the judgment, 401 U.S. at 754, for the reasons expressed in his dissent in Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping is
not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment because speech is not encompassed within the phrase "persons, houses, papers, and effects."). Justice Brennan concurred in the result, 401 U.S. at 755, because the Court of Appeals applied Katz to facts
arising before Katz was decided contrary to Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
Justices Douglas, 401 U.S. at 756, Harlan, id. at 768, and Marshall, id. at 795, dissented.

38. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

39. State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969).
40. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 399 U.S. 926 (1970).

THE LIMITS OF LA WYERING

339

Attorney General was not a neutral and detached magistrate,4 1 the Court
considered the state's arguments that its activities were justified even
without a warrant. For present purposes the contentions that the car
was lawfully seized because it was in plain view and that the receipt of
the guns and clothing from the wife was lawful are of primary importance.
Before Katz the police could seize an item they had probable cause
to believe was contraband or a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime
if the item was in plain view from a place the police had a lawful right to
be."2 Since, at least before the police arrived, a person might reasonably
expect such an item to be private, Katz could have been read as destroying
the plain view rule by making the discovery of the item a search subject
to the warrant requirement or one of its exceptions."3 Under a broad
reading of White, of course, the plain view rule would survive as long as
the person subjected to intrusive governmental conduct turned out to be a
criminal.
Coolidge addressed the plain view question in a part of the opinion
joined by only four justices." justice Stewart, writing for the plurality,
first characterized the plain view rule as an exception to the warrant requirement, rather than as a rule exempting conduct from the fourth
amendment because the conduct was not a search. 5 Treating the intrusion which led to the plain view as the search,' Stewart said that plain
view does not occur until a search is in progress."7 Thus he backed away
from the strict logic of Katz by looking at what the police were doing
rather than the suspect's expectations to define a search. Next the
plurality approved the plain view rule as consistent with the policies underlying the warrant requirement-eliminating serches not based on probable cause and limiting searches as narrowly as possible. 8 Then,
however, the plurality stated that the plain view rule is limited in two
unrelated ways: (1) "[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the
warrantless seizure of evidence;"' 9 and (2) "[T]he discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent. 50
While the second limitation (inadvertence) is necessary to serve the
41. 403 U.S. at 449-53. The almost incredible fact that only five Justices could
agree on even this seemingly self-evident point is some index of the confusion and divi-

sions on
42.
43.
44.

search and seizure issues within the Court.
See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.).
But see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234,'236 (1968) (per curiam).
403 U.S. at 464-73 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

45. Id. at 464.

46. Id. at 465-67.
47. Id. at 467.
48. Id. at 467-68.
49. Id. at 468 (emphasis in original).

50. Id. at 469.
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policy of confining the scope of searches and to combat the threat of
general warrants, the first destroys the plain view rule. As we have seen,
the rule permits the seizing of items in plain view from a place where the
police lawfully are. Prohibiting the seizure of items just because they are
in plain view and requiring a warrant or exception to seize them destroys
the rule. If the plurality opinion states the law, the modern plain view
rule merely permits the police to use their inadvertent lawful plain view
discovery of an item as evidence to obtain a warrant to seize the item or as
part of the legitimation of an immediate seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Justice Stewart accomplished this enormous restriction of the plain
view rule first by focusing on the seizure aspect of plain view problems,
having found a search by looking at police conduct rather than
suspect expectations; and second by putting the problem into the context
of the policies underlying the warrant requirement. Thus he blurred the
distinction which had been clear in Katz5 between defining a search and
evaluating one, and he quite properly began to focus on police conduct to
answer the newly merged inquiry. Having done that, Stewart also moved
away from fact style decision making. While inadvertence is a typical fact
style question, Stewart will not let too much turn on it. Even if a discovery is inadvertent, seizure is still prohibited without a warrant or an
exception. This is a clear, unmistakable, easily applied rule.
Except for three confusing features Coolidge would represent a large
step in the direction of non-fact style fourth amendment decision making
and hence toward useful clarification of substantive fourth amendment
law. Unfortunately, though, substantial confusion remains. First, the
plain view portion of the Coolidge opinion represents the views of only
a plurality of the Court. One can only guess at the status of the plurality's
opinion in the presently constituted Court. Second, the legitimacy of a
warrantless plain view seizure now depends upon a finding of inadvertence
and an exception to the warrant requirement. Inadvertence is a fact style
inquiry, and as we shall see, 2 the emphasis on exigent circumstances as
the basis for most exceptions to the warrant requirement is perhaps the
worst example of the evils of fact style adjudication. Thus, Coolidge may
have solved one problem only to remit decision of actual cases to fact style
analysis in a different context. Finally, the plurality opinion itself creates
one inexplicable confusion. Justice Stewart refers to the fact that the
seized automobile was not contraband, stolen goods, or dangerous in itself, and says that allowing the seizure of such an item in plain view with51.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

354-59.
52. See notes 120-85 infra & text accompanying.

Compare id. at 348-53 with id. at
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out a warrant or exception "would fly in the face" of the warrant requirement." Does Stewart mean to suggest that the old plain view rule lives
for stolen goods, contraband, and dangerous items and to create a new
dichotomy similar to the old distinction between mere evidence and contraband, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime?" If so, his clear rule is
gone and we are returned to the profitless inquiry into, for example, what
objects are dangerous in themselves. Is a gun without a person to shoot
it more dangerous than Coolidge's driverless car? The reasons supporting
the plurality's approach to plain view apply equally whatever the item in
plain view is. The need for prior judicial determination of probable cause
and limitation of the scope of searches does not vary with the items to
be seized. If the old plain view rule lives for some types of objects, Coolidge accomplished very little indeed.
These confusions aside, though, and reading Coolidge optimistically,
it is a step away from the Katz-White style of adjudication. The result
in Coolidge is the one compelled by the logic of Katz. The way of reaching the result, though, is a good deal more sound. In terms of impact on
other cases the Coolidge plurality approach will prevent both debacles
like White and excessive and unrealistic controls on the police. If Katz
controlled, the police could not even use their observations during a lawful search to justify later getting a warrant for an object observed in
plain view since seeing the object would constitute a search (official invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy) without a warrant or an
exception to justify it. Such a result would be ridiculous and truly would
ignore the realities of law enforcement. The Coolidge approach, by permitting evidentiary use of knowledge obtained when police see items in
plain view, avoids this unnecessary restriction on the police while protecting individuals from the vagaries of fact style adjudication. In other
words, the abandonment of the fact style inquiry permits a court to draw
the oft mentioned balance between individual rights and law enforcement
needs.
Justice Stewart's handling of the consent search problem in Coolidge
is consistent with my analysis of his approach to plain view and provides
some grounds for optimism. On the question of consent searches, Justice
Stewart spoke for a six man majority of the Court.5 5 The question was
the admissibility into evidence of the items Mrs. Coolidge delivered to
the police. The Court held the evidence was admissible, not because the
53. 403 U.S. at 471-72.
54. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967), rejecting the distinction
and the so called "mere evidence' rule.
55. 403 U.S. at 484-90; id. at 491 (opinion of Harlan, 3., concurring) ; id. at 493
(opinion of Burger, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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search and seizure of the items Wa§ proper, but betause-the police engaged
in no search'and seizure at alL 8 The Court examined the conduct and
motives of the police and-of Mrs. Coolidge-t6 reach the decision that there
had been no search: When the' police went to the Coolidge home to talk
to "Mrs. Coolidge, they were nfot motivated by a desire .tofind the murder
weapon. They behaved "with perfect courtesy." They. did not try to
coerce or dominate her or to direct her actions by "more subtle techniques
of 'suggestion. . . ." As -for Mrs. Coolidge, the Court said that surely if
she had voluntarily taken the guns and clothes to the police station, they
would have been admissible. Now when she produced them for inspectnn ,"it'was not incumbent on the police t6 stop her or avert their eyes."
Further, Mrs. Coolidge's motiVe in"
presenting the items was to aid her
husband, so that no difficult problemof whether she was an agent of the
police could arise. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter official
iisconduct, and none occurred here. .There was no search and seizure.
The fourth amendment does not apply.
The death of the Katz approach is apparent. In Coolidge we see
the Court-looking at what the police did, not what.the subject expected,
to find a search. The police did not go looking for the murder weapon.
The person who gave it to them was not trying to help them. If she
had given it to them elsewhere, the absence of searching conduct would
be. clear. Therefore, the police did not search. The focus seems finally to
have returned to the relevant place, the conduct of the police.
Furtller examining police conduct, the Court noted the officers'
impeccable behavior and the absence of any conduct that should be deterred. Thus, the questions of what constitutes a search and when a search
is lawful continue to merge. The implication of this merger for the law of
third party consent searches is substantial. If the Court decides the ques.tion of whether the police have searched by evaluating police conduct and
motivation and the motives and possible agency status of the consenting
party, the decision that there was a search is equivalent to the decision
that it was unconstitutional. That is, the Court will only find a search if
the conduct of the police was offensive in some way, and offensive police
conduct requires suppression of the evidence it unearths. Put another
way, the Court has rejected the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement. If the police searched in a third party consent context,
they needed a warrant.- Thus, the Court has backed away from the fiction
filled fact style analysis of Stoaner v. California1 and Frazier v. Cupp,5 8
56. Id. at 487-90.
57. 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (search of defendant's hotel room with hotel clerk's, but
not defendant's, consent unconstitutional).
58. 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (joint user of defendant's duffel bag may consent to
its search).
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where inquiry was, made with coriflicting results into -such questions as
apparent authority and what a suspect "must be taken to haveassumhd."2 9
Once again, though, as in the case of plain view searches, the' retreat
from fact style analysis is only partial. The inquiry into whether any
search occurred still raises fact style questi6ns, albeit some of them are
very easy to resolve. Nonetheless, in terms of providing clarification of
search and seizure law, the plain view and concent portions of Coolidge
do seem to represent the beginning of a useful new approach to determining what is a search and to limiting the number of areas in which fact
style adjudication prevails"
Unfortunately, any movement away from fact ityle decision making
in Coolidge is not matched in other areas of search and seizure law. While
the majority view still seems to be'that except in a few situations a search
warrant is required to justify a search,6" the law is almost as confused and
fact oriented as if the opposing view that all "reasonable" Searches are
constitutiona' prevailed.
Next to the question of what constitutes a: s'eafch or seizure, the most
pervasive problem in fourth' amendment law is determining the meaning
of probable cause and whether it exists in a given case. Probable cause to
believe an item is in a specific place and is connected with criminal activity
is necessary to obtain a search warrantY2 In the absence of such a warrant, the same kind of probable cause is required to support most exceptions to the search warrant requirement." One major exception which
requires no showing of probable cause to search is that a search may be
performed incident to a lawful arrest.6" However, since probable cause
to believe the subject committed a crime is necessary to make an arrest
lawful,6" the meaning of probable cause is once again determinative. How
does the Supreme Court go about deciding the meaning and existence ot
nonexistence of probable cause?
In Draper v. United States,66 a search incident to arrest case', the
Court defined probable cause. Quoting from Carroll v. United States67
the Court said,
59. Id. at 740.
60. In addition to Cooldige, see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (dissenting opinion). On the
competition between the warrant preference view 'and the reasonableness view see notes
120-24 infra& tex-t accompanying.
62. See Comment. Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the

Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961).
63. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
64. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
65. E.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
66. Id.
67. 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within
[the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that"
an offense has been or is being committed."8
Any test which turns on the reasonable man's perceptions of anything is, of course, an archetypal example of a fact style approach to a
legal problem. Indeed the Draper Court was particularly forthright in
adopting fact style analysis. The Court quoted Brinegar v. United
States69 for the proposition that
In dealing with probable cause, ..
as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."'
This view of the role of probable cause utterly misconceives the purpose of the concept ad its relation to the fourth amendment. Admittedly
"probable cause" sounds like the name of a changing and flexible concept,
but no more so than the term "unreasonable" in the first clause of the
fourth amendment; and surely the label's impact on the ear ought no
more to control the one situation than the other. Probable cause is a constitutional term, whose meaning the Supreme Court must elucidate. Of
course it is a technical concept, one designed to control the conduct of
reasonable and prudent men as well as unreasonable and imprudent ones,
and not to be defined by them. The fourth amendment exists to control
the government. It is folly to let the controlled dictate the terms by which
they will be regulated. A definition of probable cause which turns on the
perceptions of reasonable police officers is no standard at all and cannot
be expected to contribute to the evolution of rules to deter undesirable
police conduct.
Unfortunately, the history of the probable cause concept has been one
of an abortive attempt to move away from a Draper fact style analysis
followed by a return to fact style adjudication and chaos. Draper itself
involved a defendant charged with knowingly concealing and transporting
narcotic drugs. One Hereford, a paid informer of the Bureau of Narcotics, who had previously provided reliable information, told an agent
that Draper was "peddling narcotics" in Denver, that he had gone to
Chicago by train on September 6, and would return by train with three
68. 358 U.S. at 313.
69. 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
70. 358 U.S. at 313.
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ounces of heroin on the morning of September 8 or 9. He described
Draper and his clothing with some particularity and said that Draper
would be carrying a tan zipper bag, and that he always walked very fast.
On the morning of September 9, agents saw a person who matched Hereford's description of Draper depart from an incoming Chicago train and
walk fast toward the station exit, carrying a tan zipper bag. The agents
arrested Draper, searched him, and found heroin in his possession.
Draper sought reversal of his conviction on the ground that the heroin
should have been suppressed because the search which uncovered it was
not incident to a lawful arrest. The police, he argued, lacked probable
cause to arrest him. Applying the test set out above, the Court found
that the agents did have probable cause and that therefore the arrest and
incidental search were lawful.
The Court noted that Hereford's information to the agent, while
hearsay, took on an air of credibility because of Hereford's past reliability.7 ' When, pursuing Hereford's tip, agents saw a man matching
Draper's description doing what Hereford said Draper would do where
and when he said Draper would do it, they had reasonable grounds to
believe the critical part of Hereford's information since all the nonincriminating part had been personally verified."2 Dissenting, Justice
Douglas read the facts differently. 3 He pointed out that the police had
only an informer's tip to support the notion that Draper was committing
a crime. All the conduct described by Hereford and witnessed by the
agents was perfectly innocent and added nothing to the informer's tip, of
whose basis the agents were entirely ignorant.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions are right. Draper's
appearance and visible conduct were entirely innocent and capable of being
known by persons with no knowledge of his criminal activities. Permitting this arrest and search raises the specter of a society controlled by
informers where the citizen is at the mercy of an acquaintance who wishes
him ill. On the other hand, though, common sense, if not logic, does
suggest that when a previously reliable informer demonstrates a fair
degree of familiarity with a third person's mannerisms, and tells the police
the third person will arrive from Chicago with heroin on a certain date,
the police ought to actively suspect heroin possession when the third party
arrives as predicted.
The facts, in other words, are ones on which reasonable men may
differ-which is precisely why a given judge's or group of judges' opinion
about them ought not to control matters as grave as fourth amendment
71. Id.
72.

Id.

73. Id. at 314-25 (dissenting opinion).
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ights. Draper unfairly suggested to the police that they could rely on
very little evidence to;constitute probable cause, while later cases refused
to permit arrests" or searches in similar circumstances.' A conscientious
police officer after Draper almost had to arrest or search on the basis of
cvidence which later turned out to be insufficient. When a policeman
cannot distinguish cases in which he is rebuked for acting from those in
which the Court says he "would have been derelict in his duties"75 had
he not acted, it is small wonder that the police disobey the dictates of the
fourth amendment and disrespect the Court.
In 1964 the Court moved to correct the intolerable situation left by
Draper. In Aguilar v. Texas,7 ' another informer case, the Court established two requisites for the sufficiency of an informer's tip to establish
probable cause to obtain a search warrant. The affidavit supporting the
warrant application must show: (1) some of the underlying circumstances on which the informant based his conclusions, and (2) some of
the underlying circumstances which led the police to believe him. Translated to the warrantless arrest context of Draper,the police would presumably have to testify at a suppression hearing as to the information
on which the informer had based his tip and why they believed their
informer. Measured by those standards the Draperevidence would have to
have been suppressed because, as Justice Douglas pointed out, the agents
lacked "any of -thefacts which the informer may have had.""'
Aguilar represented a salutary movement away from fact style adjudication and toward specific rules to govern police conduct. The approach was sound as the Court began telling the police what to do. Naturally, Aguilar left open many questions: How many circumstances
must be related? Can a large number of highly persuasive circumstances
on one of the two Aguilar "prongs" make up for a deficiency on the other?
To what extent can evidence insufficient to provide probable cause corrobjorate an insufficient tip to add up to an adequate showing? Lnfortunately, the Court in working out answers to some of these questions has
retreated from the Aguilar approach with the result that the law of probable cause is chaos once again.
,
Spinelli v. United StatesZ8 presented the question of the corroboration .of an insufficient tip by independently insufficient evidence, in many
ways the same question with which the Court had grappled in Draper.
74.
Harris,
1959).
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); cf. United States v.
321 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1963); Baysden v. United States, 271 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314, 324 (dissenting opinion).
393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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Thus, Spinelli provided an opportunity to strengthen the Aguilar approach
and abandon Draper explicitly as Aguilar had appeared to do implicitly.
Justice Harlan's opinion forthe Court was not so clear.
The F.B.I., suspecting William Spinelli of interstate gambling activities, obtained a search warrant for a St. Louis apartment based on an
affidavit which alleged that: (1) On four of five days during which the
F.B.I. had Spinelli under surveillance, Spinelli was seen crossing a bridge
from Illinois to St. Louis between 11:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. and parking
his car in a specific apartment house's parking lot between 3:30 and
4:45 p.m. Once he was seen to enter a particular apartment in the building; (2) The apartment contained two telephones, listed in the name of
Grace P. Hagen, with numbers WY4-0029 and WY4-0136; (3) Spinelli
was known to affiant and federal and local law enforcement agents as a
bookmaker, gambler, and associate of bookmakers and gamblers; and (4)
The F.B.I. had been informed by "a confidential reliable informant" that
Spinelli was operating a handbook, accepting wagers and disseminating
wagering information by means of telephones 'WY4-0029 and WY4-0136.
The government's search pursuant to the'warrant uncovered evidence
necessary for Spinelli's conviction.
The Court recognized, of course, that the tip referred to in the fourth
allegation was by itself insufficient under Aguilar to permit a finding of
probable cause."9 The affidavit provided neither support for the conclusion that the informer was reliable nor a statement of the circumstances
upon which the informer himself had relied. Having rejected the possibility of finding probable cause on the basis of the informer's tip, the
Court considered the corroborating allegations."0 In order to provide
probable cause, the Court said, the corroborated tip must be "as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent
corroboration.""' This tip, even when corroborated, fell short.
In determining the sufficiency of the corroboration, the Court said
Draper "provides a suitable benchmark."" While a magistrate confronted with the details of the informer's report in Draper "could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable
way. . . this meager report [the tip in Spinelli] could easily have been
obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar.""
Furthermore, the F.B.I.'s independent investigation showed, at most, that
Spinelli could have used the identified phones for some purpose. Unlike
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 416.
Id. at 416-19.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416. See also id. at 417 ("Draper provides a relevant comparison.").
Id. at 417.
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the independent evidence in Draper which "corroborated much more
than one small detail'" and showed that the informer's tip was not
fabricated and was "of the sort which in common experience may be
recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way,"85 this evidence
fails to satisfy the Aguilar requirements. Finally, the statement that
Spinelli was known to be a gambler was entitled to no weight.8" The
affidavit failed to show probable cause, the warrant was improperly
issued, and the evidence should have been suppressed.
The Spinelli opinion, while probably reaching the right result, made
no sense. The Court purported to "explicate" 87 the principles of Aguilar
by using Draperas an example of a case that would meet Aguilar's requirements. While Drapermay have been decided correctly, it is hard to
justify in terms of Aguilar's two prong test. Having revived Draper,
the Court then refused to apply it to Spinelli, a case whose facts were
arguably as strong or stronger for the prosecution than Draper's, thus
leading Justice White to complain that "The majority . . . while seemingly embracing Draper,confines that case to its own facts."8 8 One reading Spinelli might well ask whether the Court had followed Draper, distinguished it (and if so, upon what basis), or overruled it.
Spinelli is a classic example of letting the tail (of rules about informers' tips) wag the dog (of probable cause). Probable cause is a
concept independent of rules about informers, and may exist without any
informer being involved. The informer cases merely exemplify one
method by which probable cause may be obtained. Aguilar provided a
rule for measuring the sufficiency of the informer's tip to provide probable
cause when the police relied entirely on the tip. Nothing in the Aguilar
opinion bears on the question of what constitutes probable cause in a noninformer case. Spinelli involved an inadequate tip, and could, therefore,
have been viewed the same as a case involving no tip at all. However, the
non-tip evidence alone also failed to provide probable cause. Thus, the
question presented was whether the tip and non-tip evidence combined
to provide probable cause. The ultimate inquiry always remained probable cause, not the adequate of the tip. Thus, the Court should have
asked whether a tip which does not meet Aguilar's standards may nonetheless be used to corroborate other evidence of probable cause, and, if so,
which insufficient tips may be so used and how much weight they may be
'accorded. Instead the Court asked the opposite question: To what ex84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 428-29 (concurring opinion).
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tent may non-tip evidence be used to corroborate an inadequate tip?
Evidence gained through an independent F.B.I. investigation of a suspect can no more show the basis for an informer's tip than investigation
of apples can tell one anything about an orange. But the information on
which the informer based his tip is irrelevant anyway, since the tip is not
in issue. The question is whether the tip contributes materially to a finding of probable cause. The tip's basis may be worth examining on that
question, but not by proving that it must have had a basis since it seemed
to accord with reality independently revealed. An independent revelation
is not strengthened by the assertion that an anonymous tipster said something consistent with it. The revelation stands or falls by itself. It fell
in Spinelli because it indicated nothing bad about the defendant. Why
did it not fall in Draper?
Unlike the tip in Spinelli, the one in Drapersatisfied one of Aguilar's
two requirements. It did provide a basis for believing the informer. Thus,
the tip in Draper was arguably not worthless on the issue of probable
cause. At least it came from a source whose credibility was established.
Moreover, the independently revealed evidence in Draper was different
from that in Spinelli. The Spinelli informer reported an existing fact,
which many people could have known. The Draper informer predicted
the future in detail. It is true that there was nothing incriminating about
Draper's conduct, but all his conduct was precisely predicted by a person
known to be reliable who al.o predicted incriminating conduct. Thus,
there was reason to believe Hereford, the informer, knew what he was
talking about. The tip's basis was established not because the tip was
shown to accord with reality, but because it predicted future reality. Thus,
Draper involved a tip whose basis in reality was shown and which came
from a reliable source. It satisfied the substance, if not the form of
Aguilar.
The trouble, of course, is that the very essence of Aguilar was quite
properly an insistence on form. Justice Harlan in Spinelli tried to comply
with the form by insisting that the non-tip evidence tend to establish the
two Aguilar requisites for a tip. He should have saved Aguilar for pure
tip cases and proceeded to an independent evaluation of the existence of
probable cause in the case before the Court. Doing so, it is clear that
absent any reason to believe the tip, innocent conduct plus a tipster's accurate assertion of one public fact provide no grounds to search. Stated
simply, without the tip, the Spinelli evidence failed to show probable
cause; the tip added nothing; therefore, no probable cause was shown.
The result of refocusing the inquiry as I have suggested would have
been to leave Aguilar's non fact style approach intact in a limited area
while leaving the broader area of probable cause open for such develop-
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innt as seemed appropriate. The Court could have used Spinelli to announce a non-fact style rule for determining probable cause or waited for
a different case as it chose. Instead, it clouded the one non-fact style rule
it had already developed in the area.
The Spinelli Court did lay down one new rule, though: A bald assertion that a suspect is known to be a criminal of some sort is entitled
to no weight on the question of probable cause."s Unfortunately, even
that rule is in jeopardy as, since Spinelli, the Court has added to the confusion of the probable cause cases.
United States v. Harris" involved a search performed pursuant to a
warrant issued on the following affidavit:
Roosevelt Harris has had a reputation with me for over four
years as being a trafficker of nontaxpaid distilled spirits, and
over this period I have received numerous information [sic]
from all types of persons as to his activities. Constable Howard
Johnson located a sizeable stash of illicit whiskey in an
abandoned house under Harris' control during this period of
time. This date, I have received information from a person who
fears for their life [sic] and property should their name be
revealed. I have interviewed this person, found this person to
be a prudent person, and have, under a sworn verbal statement,
gained the following information: This person has personal
information of and has purchased illicit whiskey from within the
residence described, for a period of more than 2 years, and most
recently within the past two weeks, has knowledge of a person
who purchased illicit whiskey within the past two days from the
house, has personal knowledge that the illicit whiskey is consumed-by purchasers in the outbuilding known and utilized as
the "dance hall,' and has seen Roosevelt Harris go to the other
outbuilding, l6ated about "50 yards' from the residence, on
numerous occasions, to obtain whiskey for this person and other
91
persons.
The Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, 2 reinstated Harris' conviction based on evidence obtained by the search. 'Chief Justice Burger
announced the judgment for the badly divided Court: After emphasizing
the importance of giving a liberal, common sense interpretation to applica89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 418-19.
403 U.S. 573 (1971).
Id. at 575-76.
'United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
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dons for search warrants,9 the Chief Justice (here joined only by
Justices Black and Blackmun) adopted as the test of an affidavit's sufficiency language from Jones .v. United States9 4 to the effect that an affidavit relying in part on an informer's tip is sufficient if there was a
"substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay.95 He found such a basis in
Harris in the affidavit's recitation of the informant's personal observat;ons, and in affiant's knowledge of Constable Johnson's earlier seizure.9"
He rejected the necessity of an allegation that the informer had previously
given correct information, 7 and he considered as probative the allegation of affiant's knowledge of Harris' reputation, specifically refusing to
follow' Spinelli's prohibition against considering such a statement,9 8
Finally, with Justice White now joining the plurality, the Chief Justice
found an additional reason to credit the informer's testimony in the fact
that it contained statements against his penal interest.9 9 Significantly,
Justices Black and Blackmun, who joined Chief Justice Burger's whole
opinion, also urged that Spinelli be overruled. 0 0 Justice Stewart agreed
with the liberal reading dicta and concurred in the judgment. 1 Justice
White, considering the affidavit as a whole, also concurred in the judgment." 2
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall
dissented.' He said that in informer cases a magistrate may find probable
cause only if he concludes that (1) the knowledge attributed to the informant would support a finding of probable cause, if true; (2) the affiant
is truthfully reporting the informer's information; and (3) "it is reasonably likely" that the informer's report was correct.'
Harrisraised the
question of the correctness of the informer's report, which Harlan said
can be decided only by looking to the two Aguilar requirements." 5 Here
Justice Harlan found a sufficient showing of the circumstances on which
the informer based his tip,' but not a.sufficient showing of the informer's
eliability.'"

93. 403 U.S. at 577; see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).

94. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
95. 403 U.S. at 580-81.
96. Id. at 581.

97. Id. at 581-82.
98. Id. at 582-83.
99. Id. at 583-84.
100. Id. at 585 (concurring opinion of Black, J.); id. at 585-86 (concurring opinion
of Blackmun, J.).

101. Id. at 585.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 586 (dissenting opinion).

104. Id. at 587.

105. Id. at 587-88.

106. Id. at 589.
107. Id. at 590-93.
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Even assuming that the allegation that the informer was "prudent"
meant that he was "credible" or "reliable,"'0 8 the allegation was insufficient because a magistrate, not a policeman filing an affidavit, is supposed
to make the determination of reliability. " 9 The underlying circumstances
necessary to permit the magistrate to make that judgment are missing
here."' The informant's claim to be speaking from personal knowledge
will not suffice since that goes to the reliability of the information if true
and not to the likelihood of its being true."' Furthermore, Constable Johnson's four-year-old seizure is too remote to permit present inferences to
be drawn from it ;"1 the reports of "all types of persons" about defendant's
activities merely amount to another assertion that his reputation is bad;""8
and the declaration against interest argument is absurd, especially in view
of the favorable treatment the government gives informers. 14 In short,
Justice Harlan found the Chief Justice's analysis totally unpersuasive,
indicating "more a firm hostility to Aguilar, Nathanson,"5 and Spinelli
than a careful judgment as to the principles those cases reflect."" 6
A fair reading of the Chief Justice's opinion and the expressed views
ef Justices Black and Blackmun suggests that Justice Harlan's perception
of hostility was correct. Where that leaves us is unclear. Even trying to
avoid speculation on the effect of the substitution of Justices Powell and
Rehnquist for Black and Harlan, murkiness is the order of the day. The
four Harris dissenters obviously take seriously the rule approach of
Aguilar, read Spinelli as carrying that approach forward, and prefer that
style of decision making to the vague fact style approach of the three
plurality Justices' substantial basis test. The views of Justices Stewart
and White are largely unexpressed, and I think it is fair to say on the basis
of Justice White's strange separate opinion in Spinelli, 7 and virtual
silence in Harris,that the Justice himself is unsure about these matters.
Surely the result in Harrisis inconsistent with Aguilar and Spinelli.
Harrisupholds a finding of probable cause based on a tip corroborated
108. Id. at 591 & n.4.

109. Id. at 590-91.
110. Id. at 591.
111. Id. at 591-93.

112. Id. at 596.
113. Id. at 596-98.
114. Id. at 594-96.
115. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).

116. 403 U.S. at 601.
117. The majority, however, while seemingly embracing Draper, confines that
case to its own facts. Pending full scale reconsideration of that case, on the
one hand, or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases on the other, I join the opinion of
the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm would
produce an equally divided Court.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 428-29 (1969) (concurring opinion).
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only by reputation evidence and one four-year-old event. That is a far
cty from the independent detail held insufficient in Spinelli and accepted in
Draper. Factually, Harrisis almost on all fours with Aguilar; yet the
Crurt reached the opposite result. What we know after Harrisis that a
majority of the Court prefers a fact style approach on the question of probable cause to the rules of Aguilar, and, that, as a consequence, predicting
results of cases is impossible. A policeman or a magistrate could not possibly know what is required of him after Harris. Here, as elsewhere, fact
style adjudication prevents a deterrent sanction from having any chance
to succeed. Moreover, a pervasive fact style approach prevents a policeman or magistrate even from knowing the few rules which probably do
exist. Four Justices oppose using reputation evidence to show probable
cause; three do not; two others join the three in result because (1) affidavits should be liberally construed," 8 and (2) "the affidavit, considered
as a whole, was sufficient to support issuance of the warrant." ' What
is a magistrate to do?
Assuming that the government has performed a search or seizure
governed by the fourth amendment and that the probable cause issue in
whatever context it presents itself can be resolved, the next major issue is
whether the police needed a warrant to search or seize. The fourth amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 2 '
For years the conjunction of the amendment's two clauses caused
substantial confusion as to whether searches pursuant to warrant were the
norm or merely one acceptable form of search with warrantless
searches being equally acceptable as long as they were not 5'unreasonable." 2 In 1967, Katz v. United States' 2 made clear the Court's preference for searches with warrants, and the warrant preference view still
prevails 22 although its position is precarious at best." 4 For purposes of
118. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 585 (1971)
119. Id. (opinion of White, J.).
120.

(opinion of Stewart, J.).

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

121. See generally Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows

on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cr. L. REv. 664, 678-86 (1961).
122. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
123. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ; Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
124. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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avoiding a fact style approach to fourth amendment problems, the warrant
preference 4iew is Obviofisly the more desirable. Unfortunately, though,
the working otit of the exceptions to the warrant requirement has.created
a situation very close to that which would prevail if the law insisted only
that searches be reasonable. Once again fact style decision making is the
norm, and chaos is the result.
For years most searches were performed without a warrant under
21
the rule permitting warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest.
Since felony arrests may be made with or without arrest warrants"' anyplace the police happen to find their suspect, and since the right to search
fcllows autoratically from the lawful arrest," 7 the search incident to lawful arrest exception permitted a search of a place of the police's choosing
without any requirement of the existence, much less a showing, of probable cause to search, and without even requiring a prior showing of probable cause to arrest. The warrant avoidance possibilities of such an exception are enormous, and if any significant scope is permitted the police
engaged in a searcli incident to lawful 'arrest, the need for search warrants
will be slight indeed.
Before 1969 the proper scope of searches incident to lawful arrests
was a matter of frequent litigation in the Supreme Court, and the results
were spotty and unpredictable at best.'28 However, after the clear 1967
announcement of the warrant preference, conditions were obviously ripe
for a substantial restriction of the search incident exception to close this
gaping loophole in the requirement that the police search only pursuant
to search warrants. That restriction came in the 1969 case of Chimel v.
California."
In Chimnel three police officers went to defendant's home to arrest
him for the burglary of a coin shop. They waited ten or fifteen minutes
with defendant's wife till defendant arrived home, arrested him, and asked
his permissiori to search., He refused to'consent, but the officers, who had
no search warrant, searched the entire three bedroom house, attic, garage,
and workshop anyway, and seized numerous items. Over objection, these
items were admitted into evidefice against defendant at his burglary trial.
The Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction:
Writing for the majority, justice Stewart reviewed the history of the
125. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTUTIONM. INTERPRETATiON 48 (1969).
126. L. HALL, Y. KA IsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRI-MINAL PROCEDURE
270 (3d ed. 1969).
127. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
128. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) and Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) with Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948),

129. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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'searcli incident exception"

That culminated, in the decision in United
States v. Rabinowiti,"' which "has come to stand for the prop6sition"
that an incidental search could extend to the area in the possession or
under the control of the'arrested person. 2 After noting that historically
Rabinowitz was "hardly founded on- an unimpeachable line of authority,"'). Justice Stewart examined the merits of the Rabinowitz rule. He
looked to the reason for the search incident exception, which exists to
permit officers to protect thems.elves from armed arrestees and to prevent
the destruction of evidence, and found that Rabinowitz provided more
latitude for the police* than the reason for the rule would support."'
Searches beyond the area from within which the arrestee can obtain a
weapon or destructible evidence are not necessary to protect the police or
to prevent the defendant.from destroying evidence. Therefore, the Court
overruled 3. Rabinowitz and its precursor Harris v. United States"8 and
limited the permissible scope of searches incident to lawful arrest to the
area within the arrestee's "immediate control-construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence."" 7 Like all legal rules the Chimel rule left some questions open and some
room for interpretation, but it was about as specific as one can reasonably
expect a rule to be. It was clear and easy to understand, and while a policeman might not have liked'the rule, he could at least obey it. Furthermore,
one trying to divine the Court's attitude could deduce from Chimel a continued adherence to the warrant preference which Katz had so forcefully
articulated, and could govern his conduct accordingly.
This condition of 'happy clarity did not last'long. Justice White's
dissent 2 8 sowed the seeds of later developments. Starting from the rejected
premise that reasonableness governs which searches are permissible,"'
White concluded that the Chimel search was reasonable because the police
were confronted with "exigent circumstances" which excused them from
obtaining a warrant.'"4 Chimel's wife was present and undoubtedly knew
of the burglary. Had the police left to obtain a search warrant, -Justice
White thought Mrs. Chimel would "'very likely" have removed the stolen
130. Id. at 755-60.
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coins. Therefore, since the police had probable cause to search for the
coins, it was only reasonable for them to do so before the evidence disappeared.
Justice White conceded that since three police officers were present
4 1 One officer
at the Chimel house, another possibility did exist."
could
have remained with 'Mrs. Chimel while the others obtained the search
warrant and took defendant to jail. However, said Justice White, this
was not an acceptable alternative for two reasons: (1) the invasion of
Mrs. Chimel's privacy would be "almost as great" as that of the search;
and (2) if Mrs. Chimel summoned an accomplice, the lone policeman
could not have watched them both.4 2
Therefore, lacking any other acceptable way out of their exigent situation, Justice White concluded that the police could search without a warrant. The arrest, of course, created the exigency. Since the police had
probable cause to search before the arrest, they could easily have avoided
the difficult situation by obtaining a search warrant in advance. No
exigency prevented that. Nonetheless, as long as the arrest was lawful,
Justice White was willing to measure the exigency from the moment of
arrest, thereby allowing the police to create their own exigency and willfully avoid the search warrant requirement.
Justice White's view of exigencies is rather extreme. The facts in
Chimel were a far cry from those in the principal cases which gave rise
to an exigency exception to the warrant requirement: Carroll v. United
States,'" involving the search of a moving car on a highway; Schmerber
v. California,"' involving the extraction of blood for testing before the
alcohol believed to be in the blood dissipated; and Warden v. Hayden,"'
involving the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. Those cases all differed from
Chimel not only in the degree of emergency, but also because the police in
Carroll,Schmerber, and Hayden did not create the exigency as the police
did in Chimel.
Exigency or no exigency, though, what is important for our purposes is a comparison of the Stewart and White approaches to Chimel.
Justice White focused explicitly on exigencies, obviously a focus not likely
to produce agreement in a given case or consistency among cases. Justice
Stewart, on the other hand, laid down an inflexible rule. Yet the two
Justices' approaches were not as different as they might seem. Justice
Stewart rooted his rule in the exigencies which almost inevitably ac141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 775 n.5.
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company an arrest-the danger than an arrestee might injure the arresting officer or escape, and the danger that he might destroy evidence. Thus,
in a sense, the search incident to arrest exception as limited in Chimel is
merely a special instance of the exigent circumstances rule.
Justice White's approach is the same. Applying the reasonableness
test to searches incident to arrest, Justice White says there are so few
situations in which a search of the area necessary to protect the officer and
prevent destruction of evidence is not justified, that the law wil not inquire into the facts of a specific case to see whether the justification really
exists. He looks to specifics, factual exigencies, only when the search
exceeds that limited scope. 4 6
Justice Stewart also will permit exigent circumstances searches which
extend beyond the area permitted by Chimel,"4 ' and he and Justice White
agree that probable cause to search is a requisite of such searches.'" Thus
the two Justices agreed about much of the Chimel problem, but reached
different conclusions because of different premises about the importance
of warrants and conflicting interpretations of the facts. Stewart, committed to warrants, found no exigent circumstances. White disagreed,
although the suggestion of exigencies on the Chimel facts seems sufficiently farfetched to suggest that a retreat from the strong warrant preference is really what White had in mind.
Both the majority approach articulated by justice Stewart and the
minority view of Justice White are internally inconsistent since a narrow
search incident to arrest exception cannot easily coexist with a flexible
exigency rule. Logically, White should always review the facts, while one
committed to the Chimel limitations on incidental searches never should.
The deviation from logic costs Justice White nothing. Since he is opposed
to focusing on warrants and to broad fourth amendment protections,
designating a specific legal area (searches incident to lawful arrest) where
warrantless searches are always allowed serves his policy predispositions
while leaving him free to characterize cases as involving a different problem (exigencies) when that seems desirable. Should he wish to strike
down a search, of course, he can accomplish that by characterizing the
search as within the problem area governed by the narrow rule and finding
that the search did not meet the rule's requirements. Thus, he has preserved maximum flexibility for himself.
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, conceded far too much. By emphasizing the exigent nature of incidental searches, he gave respectability
to the exigency approach, an approach that is ultimately at war with both
146. 395 U.S. at 773 (dissenting opinion).
147. See 395 U.S. at 764 n.9.
148. Compare id. uith id. at 773-74, 780-83 (dissenting opinion).
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the warrant preference and the narrow Chimel rule. This concession to
fact style decision making led him astray in Chambers v. Maroney,4 9 although he recovered somewhat in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.'
Chambers v. Maroney was decided on June 22, 1970, the same day
5 and just one year after Chimel. Vale and Chambers
as Vale v. Louisiand'
are an incredible pair of cases, and the playing out in them of the views of
Justices White and Stewart is fascinating. Justice Stewart wrote the
Court's opinion in Vale. In 1967, two years before Chimel, Donald
Vale's bond on a pending narcotics charge was increased. The police,
armed with two arrest warrants growing out of the bond increase, set up
a surveillance of Vale's house. They observed a car drive up and blow its
horn. Vale, whom an officer recognized, came out of the house, talked to
the occupant of the car, looked up and down the street, and went inside.
Soon he returned, looked up and down again, went to the passenger side
of the car and leaned through the window. The officers, convinced a
narcotics sale had taken place, drove toward Vale. He saw them and
headed for the house, while the police foiled the car driver's attempt to
escape. They arrested Vale on his front steps. Simultaneously, the driver,
a known addict, placed something in his mouth. He was arrested. The
police told Vale they were going to search the house. Soon Vale's mother
and brother appeared and learned of the arrest and impending search. The
police found narcotics in a rear bedroom.
The search obviously could not pass muster as a search incident to a
lawful arrest under Chimel. However, since it occurred before Chimel
was decided, the Court could not apply Chimel without deciding that
Chimel was retroactive. The Court avoided the retroactivity issue by
finding the search impermissible under pre-Chimel law." 2 Even before
Chimel, the Court said, a search of a house could only be upheld as incident
to arrest if the arrest occurred inside the house. The Court emphasized its
preference for warrants and the limited nature of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Since the police were able to obtain two warrants
for Vale's arrest, the Court saw no reason to believe it was impractical
for them to obtain a search warrant as well. The arrest on the street could
not provide its own exigencies.
Justice White silently joined the majority in Vale even though on its
facts Vale was a more appealing case for the state than Chimel. In Chimel
the police created their own exigencies by failing to obtain a search warrant before they went to Chimel's house. In Vale the police could not
149.
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have obtained a search warrant in advance. As Justice Black pointed
out,"'3 nothing in the bond increase, which made the arrest warrants
lawful, gave probable cause to search Vale's house.' 5 The police observed
an unexpected narcotics sale and acted quickly to arrest the culprits.
Unless the police could reasonably be expected to have departed before
Vale's mother and brother appeared, 5' they were confronted with a situation where failure to search presented a real risk of loss of evidence. Not
only is heroin easier to destroy than stolen coins, but also Vale's brother
was a known narcotics violator,""0 probably a good deal more likely to
destroy evidence than the presumably innocent Mrs. Chimel.
Cool reflection may suggest that after seeing the sale the police should
have left Vale's home, tailed his buyer, arrested him without Vale's knowledge, and obtained a search warrant. But that is a lot to expect from
policemen who have just seen a narcotics sale take place, and who are
under orders to arrest the seller. At a minimum, the police conduct here
was less offensive and more "reasonable" than that in Chimel. Yet
Justice White who found exigencies in Chimel found none here, suggesting that he does preserve the exigency analysis for searches he wants to
uphold and the search incident analysis for searches he wants to strike
down.
Chambers v. Maroney' 7 involved the former kind of search. There,
two men robbed a service station. Two teenagers noticed a blue compact
station wagon speed from a nearby parking lot at about the time they
learned of the robbery. They told the police that four men, one wearing a
green sweater, occupied the car. The service station attendant said one
robber wore a green sweater, the other a trench coat. Within an hour the
153. Id. at 40 (dissenting opinion).
154. A police officer testified that the increased bond was the only reason the police
were seeking defendant Vale, and that the arrest warrants had nothing to do with the
items seized. Record at 78-79. The state argued that the police staked out the Vale
house because they wanted to be sure Vale was present before approaching the house.
Brief for Appellee at 1-2, 6. But see Record at 67 ("If we moved before we knew he
was there, we'd lose everything."), 82 ("[W]e had reason to believe there were narcotics
in the house. . . .") suggesting the police's success may not have been wholly fortuitous.
155. Mrs. Vale and defendant's brother James appeared three or four minutes after
the police entered the house to look for other occupants, and before the police began
their search for evidence. Record at 83. To argue that the police erred in entering
the house before Vale's relatives arrived, but would not have erred had they stood outside for four minutes and then entered the house and begun the search, would truly exalt
form over substance and prevent the police from ascertaining whether exigencies which
will justify a search exist.
156. James Vale was charged in the same proceeding as his brother Donald. Record
passhit. The statement in the text that James was a "known" rather than newly discovered narcotics violator is an inference from evidence about the police's general familiarity with the Vales. Id. passim. The record does not specifically state that James
was a previously known offender.
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police stopped a blue compact station wagon containing four men. Petitioner, one of the occupants, was wearing a green sweater. A trench coat
was in the car. The police arrested the occupants and drove the car to the
police station, where they searched it without a warrant and discovered
damning evidence. The Court upheld the search and seizure.
Writing for the majority, Justice White recognized that the search
could not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest since
the reasons that have been thought sufficient to justify warrantless searches carried out in connection with an arrest no longer
obtain when the accused is safely in custody at the station
house. '
Nonetheless, the search was valid because supported by probable cause
and performed in exigent circumstances. The teenagers' and service
station attendant's reports, the style and color of the car, the number of
its occupants, and the green sweater and trench coat provided probable
cause to search. What were the exigent circumstances?
Justice White relied on Carrollv. United States5 9 for the proposition
that an automobile may be searched in circumstances when a home or
office could not be "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quicldy moved . . . ."' He recognized that Carroll
and other cases do not always permit warrantless au'tomobile searches
on probable cause, but rather allow such searches only where
the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. . . . Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of
the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization
for a search."'
In Chambers the car was impounded at the police station, and all its occupants were under arrest. Thus, one might have thought that this was
a case without exigencies if, as Justice White had already conceded, any
automobile case could be. Yet Justice White found exigencies here even
as he had in Chimel.
Considering the possibility that only the immobilization of the car
should be permitted while the police obtained a warrant, Justice White
could not decide whether immobilization or a warrantless search was the
greater intrusion." 2 Seeing no constitutional difference between holding
158.
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160.
161.
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a car and searching it, he concluded that either course was reasonable.368
He noted that different consequences might attach in a case of "unforeseeable cause to search a house" (citing Vale),16 but reiterated the con65
stitutional difference between houses and cars.
Justice White's opinion does not withstand analysis. Once the car
was seized and its occupants arrested, the police had ample time to obtain
a search warrant, and "the reasons which have been thought sufficient"
to justify exigency vehicle searches had no greater applicability than those
justifying searches incident to lawful arrests. Moreover, Justice Harlan
undercut the majority's argument against allowing only the immobilization of the car by pointing out (1) that the majority, which could not
decide whether immobilization or searching was the greater intrusion,
allowed both;... and (2) that seizure and immobilization will almost
always be the lesser intrusion since the delay will not inconvenience incarcerated defendants, and persons who wish to avoid a search will prefer a
magistrate's judgment to an immediate search. Those who prefer to avoid
delay may do so by consenting to a search.0 7
While Justice White's majority opinion in Chambers seems clearly
wrong, its wrongness is not as important as its style and its implications
for other cases. The opinion distinguishes car searches from building
searches, but the distinction is meaningless in Chambers since the reason
for the distinction (a car's mobility) was not present in the case. Whatever the other members of the majority thought, Justice White, himself,
obviously would not allow the building-car distinction to control if the
search of a house were involved. His opinion in Chambers is almost
identical to his dissent in Chimel. In each case he noted the inapplicability
of the search incident to lawful arrest exception;18 in each he stressed
the reasonableness of police conduct rather than the preference for a
search warrant ;...
in each he found exigencies' 70 when none were present
under any fair reading of the facts; and in each he postulated a nonexistent
conflict between the constitutional right asserted and another right
(Mrs. Chimel's in Chimel, the right not to have the car seized in
Chambers), suggested the inevitability of sacrificing one right, and used
the conflict and supposedly inevitable sacrifice to justify a warrantless
search. 1 Since the exigencies in Chambers were obviously no greater
163.
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than in Chimel, the Chambers majority, if it meant to be taken seriously,
sounded an early death knell for Chimel and reopened under a pseudonym
the gaping loophole which had existed in the warrant requirement before
the Chimel decision. Yet read with Vale, Chambers seems to have no such
drastic implications. The Court's reasoning in Chambers would apply
equally well to a house search as a car search, but the majority did emphasize the car-building distinction and did cite Vale for the proposition
that a different result would obtain in a house search caseY 2 Finally,
despite the similarity of the majority opinion in Chambers and Justice
White's dissent in Chimel, Justice White did vote to uphold the Chambers
car search but not the house search involved in Vale.
Justice Stewart did nothing in Chambers to clarify the situation.
Rather than take issue with the majority's apparent emasculation of
Chimel, he restated his view that fourth amendment violations are not
sufficient grounds for collateral attack, but, recognizing his obligation
under existing law to decide the case on its merits, joined the opinion and
judgment of the Court."' Since Chambers appears to be at odds with
Justice Stewart's previously stated views and the Court's prior decisions,
Justice Stewart's position is hard to understand. He partially explained
his view in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.""
In Coolidge, where the state's search warrant was fatally defective,
the state tried to justify the seizure and search of defendant's car as incident to his arrest. Since the activities occurred before Chilmel, which is
not retroactive," 5 pre-Chimel law governed. Justice Stewart found the
search failed to meet even the Rabinowitz 7 standard for searches incident
to lawful arrests since it was neither substantially contemporaneous with
nor confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. 7

7

Furthermore, he

held, the seizure and search could not be justified under the exigency-car
search doctrine of Carroll and Chambers.' Justice Stewart emphasized
that the vehicle search exception was grounded in the exigency posed by
an automobile's mobility and the frequent impracticality of obtaining a
warrant to search a car. He then made a factual analysis of the pending
case to determine whether exigencies existed. He found that they did not:
The police had long known of the car's probable role in the murder;
Coolidge was cooperative and gave no indication of intending flight; he
had already had ample opportunity to destroy evidence if he meant to; the
172. 399 U.S. at 52.
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car was parked in his driveway, not being used for any illegal purpose
and not containing stolen, contraband, or dangerous items; Coolidge was
under arrest and had no opportunity to escape; the police drove Mrs.
Coolidge, the only other adult present, to another town for the night
and stayed with her there until after the car reached the station house; and
two policemen guarded the Coolidge house all night. Since the facts disclosed no exigencies, Justice Stewart did not allow the search.
Yet Chambers v. Maroney also had not involved exigencies on any
but the most strained reading of the facts, and there Justice Stewart had
joined the Court in upholding the search. In Coolidge Stewart distinguished Chambers by noting that, applying Carroll, a warrantless search
would have been permitted at the time of Chambers', but not Coolidge's
arrest. Therefore, he said:
Chambers.

.

. held only that, where the police may stop and

search an automobile under Carroll, they may also seize it and
search it later at the police station.'
The rationale of Chambers is that given a justified initial intrusion, there is little difference between a search on the open
highway and a later search at the station. Here we deal with the
prior question of whether the initial intrusion is justified. 8
The author of the Chambers opinion, of course, did not agree with
Justice Stewart about either the case's holding or its rationale. Justice
White, who had struggled to find exigencies in Chambers, now took the
position that searches of vehicles with probable cause, but without warrants, are reasonable regardless of the existence or nonexistence of exigent circumstances."8 ' Indeed, White stated that this is the principle "reaffirmed" in Chambers."2 Nothing in the Carroll-Chambetrsline of cases
limits it to cases of cars in motion or about to move. The fact that a
vehicle is movable will suffice.18 3 White concludes that "inthe interest of
coherence and credibility" the Court should overrule Chambers and
Carroll or automatically allow warrantless searches of vehicles on probable cause. 8' To do so would be in accordance with "the commonsense
standard of reasonableness governing search and seizure cases."''
The contrast in styles between Stewart and White is striking. Justice
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Stewart continues to analyze the cases like a lawyer. He looks for the
reason for a rule, studies the facts to see if the case is within the reason of
the rule, and applies the rule or not according to his view of whether the
facts and the reason for the rule fit. Justice White proceeds in an entirely
different way. Beginning with a value premise, he defines fourth amendment questions as questions of reasonableness. That done, he evaluates
each case to determine whether in his opinion the police action was reasonable. Given the total flexibility of the reasonableness concept, almost any
search can be justified by finding nonexistent exigencies to support the
police's conduct. Once Justice White succeeds in making exigency conclusive of reasonableness, he emasculates both concepts by finding groups
of cases where exigencies are so often present that they need not be proved
in specific cases. Thus, rather than see whether the reason for the rule
applies as a guide to the rule's application, he substitutes the rule for its
reason and creates a category of police conduct that will always be acceptable. Those, like Justice Stewart, who look for the principle in Justice
White's position will not find it. To the policeman seeking guidance,
though, the message is clear: in a given area proceed at will.
The similarity in the Court's handling of the questions of what constitutes a search, when does probable cause exist, and when may the police
search without a warrant is striking. The cases are replete with efforts
to apply flexible concepts like "reasonable expectations" and :'exigent
circumstances." Since such concepts do not solve real cases, the members
of the Court seek categories and rules to apply. Some justices, however,
continue to emphasize the flexible conceptual bases for the rules, and
therefore never escape the flexibility dilemma. Others, most notably
Justice White, exalt the categories over the reasons. Sometimes Jusice
White tries to explain his positions in terms of the flexible concepts; when
he does so, his opinions seldom make sense. Other times, as in his Coolidge dissent, Justice White makes clear that the reasons for rules do not
control and that categorization is controlling. When he does that, the
reader may be pleased or displeased depending upon his policy predispositions, but he will almost always be relieved at being presented with
an understandable, forthright rule. Substantial damage is done to orderly
legal development, police respect for the Court, obedience to the dictates
of the fourth amendment, and important civil rights by the unwillingness
of justices who do not share Justice White's values to adopt his categorization style in a forthright manner without the duplicitous two step
process employed, for example, in the movement from Chambers to the
Coolidge dissent.
The typical American legal style of developing the law on a case by
case basis, maintaining flexibility by resorting often to the rule of reason
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and permitting facts to exert controlling importance, and seeking to apply
rules in new factual situations only when the reasons that gave rise to
the rules exist in the new context is one of the great strengths of our legal
system. But like everything else, the utility of this style has limits. They
are exceeded in the fourth amendment context.
Flexibility, of course, means unpredictability, and if it is a virtue it is
purchased at a price. Consistency and predictability are virtues too, and
they must be sacrificed to achieve flexibility. In an area where conduct
control is a major policy, consistency seems preferable to flexibility, as
one can hardly expect individuals to conform their conduct to unannounced, unpredictable norms. Similarly, trial court judges who accept
the postulates of the crime control model of the criminal process... are
unlikely zealously to protect fourth amendment rights if the law is sufficiently unclear to make almost any decision plausible and the chance
of avoiding reversal fairly high.
Flexibility is only part of the problem. Its adverse impact is increased
when it exists side by side with clear and easily understandable inflexible
rules. A police officer confronted on the one hand with the distinction
between Coolidge and Chambers that justice Stewart tried to draw for a
minority of the Court, and on the other hand with Justice White's clear
rule that automobiles may always be searched on probable cause without a
warrant, will naturally prefer and follow the latter minority view rather
than the former. Conversely, when a rigid rule restricts behavior, the
officer is likely to follow it unless a flexible rule to govern the same situation also exists and holds out hope of achieving his desired purpose. Thus,
the Chimel rule could have been effective had the exigency rule not developed contemporaneously with it. A police officer not knowing which
rule will apply in any given case has no incentive to refrain from exceeding the bounds of Chimel. The coexistence of flexible and inflexible rules
thus creates a situation in which the police are encouraged to perform
questionable searches and seizures. This, of course, results in unnecessary
invasions of individual rights and in litigation which could well have
been avoided. The negative impact on police respect for the Court
engendered by a system which encourages game playing, taking chances,
and seeing how much one can get away with is easily predictable.
The exclusionary rule, or any deterrent sanction, must fail if the
law it is designed to enforce is tentative, flexible, and self-consciously
oriented to facts. To effectively deter police misconduct the Court must
develop inflexible categories and clear rules. It must, in other words,
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adopt for the law of search and seizure the technique which Justice Holmes
long ago inappropriately suggested for the disposition of tort cases. First
in The Common Lavi'l7 and later in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman 88 (the famous stop, look, and listen case), Holmes advocated judicial
determination of the question of negligence, the creation in advance of
8 the
the standards -of reasonable prudence. In Pokora v. Wabash Ry.,"'
Court, in an opinion by Justice Cardozo, rejected the Goodman approach,
recognizing that the dictates of reasonableness can only be drawn from
the stuff of everyday life. In the negligence context Cardozo was right,
and his view has largely prevailed. But police search and seizure practices,
unlike negligence, are not the stuff of everyday life for most citizens, and
sensible rules to govern them are imperative if they are not to become
everyday occurrences. To ask what is reasonable under the circumstances
from the police point of view is to make a jury-like, fact syle inquiry
while permitting the regulated to set the rules of regulation. The question
should be what searches are reasonable from the citizens' point of view.
After all, the people are to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures; the Constitution nowhere gives the police a right of their own to
make searches, reasonable or otherwise. The relevant perspective must
always be that of the citizen. The Court's job is to evaluate and enforce
as well as it can the citizens' competing interests in security from the police
and security from crime. The evaluation, though, must be expressed in
language directed to the police and clear and precise enough for them to
follow. Justice White was right when he said that the question is what
citizen expectations are "constitutionally 'justifiable'-what expectations
If the rest of the Court
the Fourth Amendment will protect. . . ."'
would begin to address itself to that question in bold, broad, policy terms
instead of asking what was reasonable under the circumstances or whether
sufficient exigencies existed to permit the police to search someone's property, a more coherent body of fourth amendment law would begin to
emerge.
Focusing on the broad question of how privacy compares to order,
with an eye to the development of categories and rules as specific as possible to govern fourth amendment cases, could lead to rules like the
majority rule in Chimel or like the auto search rule articulated by Justice
White. Those who both prefer due process to crime control' and subscribe to popular conceptions of judges' biases may fear the approach I
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suggest is more likely to lead to rules like the latter than the former. Even
if the prediction is justified, the fear is not. Almost any comprehensible
rules should serve libertarian ends better than the present chaotic state of
the law. Any rule developed under the fourth amendment is a limitation
on the police's power to search. The absence of rules and the contempt it
engenders are invitations to search. That may be even more true now
than a few years ago since there is no reason to believe the police are more
immune than others from making easy assumptions about the trend of
judicial decisions. Moreover, if those who assume that such decisions
represent biases are right, the style of the decisions will not affect results.
Adopting forthright, inflexible rules, though, may avoid much useless,
expensive, and frustrating litigation engendered by the current chaos,
which appears to offer hope of escaping conviction to countless criminals
much as it offers the police hope of successfully avoiding the rules.
I suggest, then, that the move away from flexible fact style adjudication in the fourth amendment context will be beneficial from the libertarian as well as the law enforcement and judicial administration perspectives. But is my proposal feasible? Can sufficiently precise rules be developed to permit a fair degree of predictability and provide grounds for
some hope of deterrence, or is conduct so variable and the legal mind so
fertile that the hope for certainty is vain? And if the rules can be formulated, does not our experience with the highly specific Mirandd'9 2 rules
suggest the game is not worth the candle because no improvement in
actual practice will result from highly specific rules?
I think the proposal is feasible. Everyone knows that absolute certainty is impossible and that a hard case can be put in which any rule will
fail. What we too often forget, though, is that not all cases are hard ones.
Most are readily classifiable instances of frequently recurring conduct.
Sometimes, as in the fourth amendment cases, the peculiarity and unintelligibility of the law itself are largely responsible for making many easy
cases hard ones. And some areas of the law in which stability and predictability are important do offer substantial certainty."a Absolutely
clear and inflexible rules cannot be achieved, but adoption of the style of
decision making typified by the law of negligence, where predictability
and stability are unusually weak policies, leads to far more confusion than
is justified or necessary.
Fortunately, search and seizure law is one area in which we can have
the best of both worlds. Adoption of an inflexible judicial search and
seizure code need not foreclose remedying unanticipated police atrocities.
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The due process clause provides an alternative route to punish governmental conduct so gross that it shocks the conscience of the court."9 ' The
law of pre-trial identification includes both the specific Wade-Gilbert..5
rules and the open ended due process approach of Simmons.9 ' Seeking
precision and a system in which the police have notice of what questionable
conduct is acceptable is perfectly consistent with maintenance of an unspecific tool to remedy abuses so offensive that they can hardly be classed
as questionable. Sufficient precision to be useful is feasible, even in a
system which retains its ability to react with horror to horrifying conduct.
Are nonfact oriented legal rules workable in the search and seizure
context? What I am advocating here is a fourth amendment approach
much like the Court's fifth amendment approach in Miranda.' Empirical
studies suggest Miranda has little impact on the number of confessions
obtained or police techniques in obtaining them.'98 Do these studies mean
that inflexible fourth amendment rules also will have little or no impact?
I think not.
The critical difference between confessions and searches and seizures is that suspects confess, but police search and seize. Miranda was
based on psychological premises about suspects undergoing police interrogation 9 . which either were wrong or dictated a more extreme result
than Miranda provided. Search and seizure rules, on the other hand, need
rest on no assumptions about suspect psychology. They merely require
lower courts willing to enforce them. Thus, evidence suggesting that rules
about pre-confession waivers do not prevent confessions in no way suggests
that rules about police conduct cannot control the police.
If the Court puts the substantive law of the fourth amendment in
order by eliminating fact style analysis, the exclusionary rule will finally
have a chance to work. At that point, it will be interesting to see how
much the rule can do.
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